They diagnose the structural design of legal procedure itself — identifying the specific rules that make bad outcomes systematically inevitable for one class of party, regardless of the underlying facts.
Legal disputes that look like they are about a specific wall, a specific expert, or a specific contract are sometimes about something else entirely: a structural gap in the design of the rules governing that dispute — a place where the legal architecture runs out, where the incentive structure goes uncorrected, and where the party who knows how to exploit the gap wins not because they are right, but because the rules make their winning structurally inevitable.
The three instruments on this platform each measure a different expression of this same underlying pattern. They produce a number — not a qualitative opinion — so the structural problem can be named, scored, and argued before litigation entrenches it.
The Competence Gap. Courts and institutions ask whether a professional is qualified to do a job. They almost never ask how close that professional's demonstrated experience is to the specific matter at hand. The gap between holding a credential and being genuinely competent for a specific technical problem is real, measurable, and currently unexamined by any formal procedure.
The Proximity Gap. Expert witnesses are required to be independent. The current test — self-declaration and adversarial challenge — has no quantitative threshold for network proximity. A direct academic or professional connection between an expert and the parties can go unchallenged simply because no formal standard for measuring it exists.
The Disclosure Gap. Most legal systems separate the rules governing disclosure before harm from the rules assigning liability after it. In the gap between those two silos, silence is free and disclosure is costly. The result is a Nash equilibrium in which the party holding private knowledge of a pre-existing problem has no incentive to share it — and the rules reward them for staying quiet.
Each tool takes raw inputs — case materials, practitioner profiles, expert and party records — and returns a scored diagnostic in seconds. All three tools are free, require no account, and work on any jurisdiction.
The last five years of AI in legal technology have addressed one class of problem: making existing legal processes faster. Contract review. Case research. Document summarisation. These are optimization tools — they assume the rules are correct and reduce the cost of working within them.
"A contract review engine makes a good process cheaper. A structural diagnostic engine asks whether the rules governing the contract are themselves distorted. You need the second before you can fully trust the first."
— The Procedural Gap Project · moral.moneyThese tools do not accelerate existing processes. They ask a prior question: is the structural design of this procedure producing systematically unfair outcomes? If so, for whom, under what conditions, and how severe?
| Typical AI legal tech | KYC.co diagnostic tools |
|---|---|
| Reads what is written in documents | Reads the structural design of the rules themselves |
| Makes the existing process faster | Asks whether the existing process is working correctly |
| Produces summaries, redlines, citations | Produces a score, a class, a threshold |
| Treats the rules as fixed and correct | Identifies where the rules systematically break |
| Value: cost reduction and throughput | Value: detecting structural failure before it becomes entrenched |
What AI enables here — that was not practically available before — is cross-domain pattern recognition. The same structural gap that appears in a Portuguese civil engineering dispute also appears in a hospital surgeon appointment, in a financial regulator's expert appointment, in an international arbitration expert panel. The pattern is the same. The gap is the same. These tools make it measurable in any of those contexts with the same instrument.
Every proposed fix to a procedural gap carries a risk: the repair can itself become a tool for bad actors. A rule requiring proximity disclosure can be gamed to delay proceedings. A rule penalising silence can be used for harassment. This is why the design of every instrument in this project obeys one constraint:
"Closing procedural loopholes that benefit bad-faith actors while ensuring the fixes are so tightly engineered that they cannot be exploited in reverse."
Each tool produces a score, not a verdict. The output is diagnostic — an evidentiary input for legal argument, not a substitute for it. A high BFM score does not mean the Passive Party is guilty. It means the incentive structure was comprehensively misaligned, and the Active Party has identifiable grounds to argue that the procedural rules were working against them. The score opens an argument. It does not close one.